Party competition on climate policy : Interest groups, ideology and challenger parties in the UK and Ireland by Carter, Neil Thomas & Little, Conor
This is a repository copy of Party competition on climate policy : Interest groups, ideology 
and challenger parties in the UK and Ireland.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/167009/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Carter, Neil Thomas orcid.org/0000-0003-3378-8773 and Little, Conor (Accepted: 2020) 
Party competition on climate policy : Interest groups, ideology and challenger parties in the
UK and Ireland. International Political Science Review. ISSN 0192-5121 (In Press) 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
Party competition on climate policy:  
interest groups, ideology and challenger parties in the UK and Ireland 
 
Neil Carter, University of York, UK 
Conor Little, University of Limerick, Ireland 
 
Corresponding author:  
Neil Carter, Department of Politics, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, UK.  
neil.carter@york.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
This study shows how interest group-ヮ;ヴデ┞ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲが ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ Iヴﾗゲゲ-cutting policy preferences, and 
competition with challenger parties shape the structure of issue competition on climate policy. It 
┌ゲWゲ デｴW けﾏﾗゲデ ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴげ I;ゲWゲ ﾗa デｴW UK ;ﾐS IヴWﾉ;ﾐS デﾗ ゲｴﾗ┘ ｴﾗ┘ SｷaaWヴWﾐIWゲ ｷﾐ ヮ;ヴデ┞ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲ 
influence the structure of issue competition. Theoretically, the study takes up the challenge of 
integrating salience and position in the conceptualisation of climate policy preferences. Empirically, 
it provides new evidence on factors influencing climate policy preferences and the party politics of 
climate change, focusing on interest groups, party ideology, and challenger parties. Further, it 
identifies similarities between the general literature on interest group influence on party 
preferences and the literature on interest groups in climate politics, and seeks to make connections 
between them.  
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Introduction 
Party policies on climate change are shaped by factors ranging from public opinion and interest 
group demands to party ideology and the nature of the party system. These policy preferences 
together constitute a structure of issue competition as parties accord an issue greater or less priority 
and take positions that are more or less polarised. 
Climate change mitigation policy consists of issues within and across several sectors; it is also a 
relatively recent arrival に since the 1990s に to domestic political agendas. The structure of issue 
competition on climate policy has implications for efforts to mitigate climate change because it 
influences public attitudes and public policy: polarisation among parties leads to polarisation among 
the public (Birch, 2020); convergent climate politics is associated with climate policy ambition 
(Christoff and Eckersley, 2011: 440; Farstad, 2019); and the priority (salience) of climate policy for 
parties is an important condition for ambitious policy (Jensen and Spoon, 2011; Carter and Jacobs, 
2014). 
This study examines the UK and Ireland to assess the roles of interest groups, wider party ideology 
(i.e., preferences that cut across climate policy preferences), and challenger parties in shaping the 
structure of issue competition on climate policy. In conceptualising the structure of issue 
competition, our point of departure is the observation that salience and position matter (Stokes, 
1963: 373; Clarke et al., 2009: 44). We develop a framework incorporating both concepts in four 
ideal-typical structures of issue competition (Guinaudeau and Persico, 2014). In applying it, we show 
that issue competition on climate policy differs in its structure between countries, and within 
countries over time and across climate policy issues.  
To explain differences in the structure of issue competition on climate policy, we focus on two 
countries that are similar in important respects and that differ in the structure of their party 
ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲが ┘ｷデｴ ｷﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲげ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ｷデｴ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲが ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ Iヴﾗゲゲ-cutting policy 
preferences, and competition on climate policy from challenger parties. We show that the structure 
ﾗa ｷゲゲ┌W IﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIWS H┞ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲげ ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW 
party system; this speaks to recent studies within and beyond comparative climate politics (Otjes 
and Rasmussen, 2017; Mildenberger, 2020). We also find that parties are constrained by policy 
preferences that cut across climate policy and by the incentive to accommodate successful 
challengers on climate policy. Thus, interest groups, ideology and challenger parties each play 
important and often mutually reinforcing roles in influencing the structure of competition on climate 
policy.  
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The study makes several contributions. First, while existing scholarship tends to assume that 
competition and party preferences on climate policy are either a matter of salience (priority) or 
position, we show that there are varieties of issue competition both between and within countries.  
Second, it makes broader contributions to the literature on party preferences, especially by using a 
comparative case study to focus on lesser-studied influences: interest groups (Otjes and Green-
Pedersen, 2019; Klüver, 2020) and party ideology (e.g., Meyer, 2013). It identifies affinities between 
important arguments in comparative climate politics (e.g., Mildenberger, 2020) and interest group-
party relations (Otjes and Rasmussen, 2017), and provides evidence to support the idea that 
institutional conditions moderate interest group influence on party preferences. Third, it contributes 
to the emerging body of research on the party politics of climate change (Båtstrand, 2014; 
Marcinkiewicz and Tosun, 2015; Carter et al., 2018; Farstad, 2018, 2019; Ladrech and Little, 2019; 
Leiren et al., 2020) with these findings on interest group influence and by showing how cross-cutting 
preferences constrain parties, and how challengers drive accommodative policy changes.  
  
Structures of issue competition on climate policy 
There are divergent assumptions and positions about whether environmental policy ね of which 
climate policy is a subset ね is a positional or valence issue. Studies of political competition on the 
environment in European democracies often identify it as an archetypal valence issue, characterised 
H┞ IﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW ｪﾗ;ﾉ ﾗa Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗデWIデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS IﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗ┗Wヴ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ 
performance or ヮWヴIWｷ┗WS IﾗﾏヮWデWﾐIW ふCﾉ;ヴﾆW Wデ ;ﾉくが ヲヰヰΓぶく Tｴｷゲ ｷゲ ヴWaﾉWIデWS ｷﾐ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWゲ ﾗa ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ 
Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ デｴW M;ﾐｷaWゲデﾗ PヴﾗﾃWIデげゲ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴW ﾗa Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ 
salience; unlike some classic positional issues such as immigration, there is no complementary 
けﾐWｪ;デｷ┗Wげ ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴW ｷSWﾐデｷa┞ｷﾐｪ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデｷﾐｪ Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ SWｪヴ;S;デｷﾗﾐ ふVﾗﾉﾆWﾐゲ Wデ ;ﾉくが ヲヰヱΓぶく  
However, the status of the environment as a valence issue has been increasingly questioned 
(Gemenis et al., 2012). Partisan differences over climate policy are notably pronounced in Australia, 
Brazil, Canada and the USA, where there have long been bitter environmental conflicts over the 
extraction of primary resources (Carter, 2018). In Australia, fierce debates over carbon pricing 
schemes have dominated successive elections, peaking in 2013 when the Liberal leader, Tony 
AHHﾗデデが I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐWS ゲ┌IIWゲゲa┌ﾉﾉ┞ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ デｴW L;Hﾗヴ Gﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ I;ヴHﾗﾐ ヮヴｷIｷﾐｪ ゲIｴWﾏW ┘ｷデｴ ; 
けヮﾉWSｪW ｷﾐ HﾉﾗﾗSげ デﾗ け;┝Wげ L;Hﾗヴげゲ デ;┝ ふCヴﾗ┘ﾉW┞が ヲヰヱΑぎ ンぶく DWWヮ ヮ;ヴデｷゲ;ﾐ Sｷ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ over climate change 
between the Republican and Democratic parties and their supporters (Dunlap et al., 2016) 
encouraged Donald Trump to campaign for the presidency on a climate-sceptic platform and to 
withdraw the USA from the Paris climate agreement. 
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Even in Europe, parties take different positions on climate policy. Most European radical right 
populist parties deny climate change exists or reject the need for urgent responses (Schaller and 
Carius, 2019), while Green parties take distinctive pro-environment policy positions. There are also 
consistent differences between right and left suggestive of positional climate politics (Båtstrand, 
ヲヰヱヴき C;ヴデWヴが Wデ ;ﾉくが ヲヰヱΒぎ Αンヶき F;ヴゲデ;Sが ヲヰヱΒぎ Αヰヵぶく SﾗﾏW ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWゲ ﾗa ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲ ヴWaﾉWIデ 
this positional aspect of environmental politics, usually assuming that it involves a trade-off between 
environment and economy (see Appendix A). 
The apparent diversity in national experiences suggests that fixed assumptions about the nature of 
climate politics may be hard to sustain; it may even differ between climate policy sectors (Leiren et 
al., 2020: 2). Many issues combine valence and positional aspects (Stokes, 1963: 373; Clarke et al, 
2009: 44) and the structure of competition can differ between contexts and issues. Yet few scholars 
(see Meguid, 2008; De Sio and Weber, 2014; Guinaudeau and Persico, 2014) bring salience and 
position together to conceptualise issue competition.  
We argue that the structure of issue competition on climate politics should be investigated rather 
than assumed, and that it can differ between contexts and climate policy issues. Building on 
G┌ｷﾐ;┌SW;┌ ;ﾐS PWヴゲｷIﾗげゲ ふヲヰヱヴぶ デ┞ヮﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWゲ ﾗa ｷゲゲ┌W IﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷﾗﾐが ┘W ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデ デｴ;デ ヮ;ヴデ┞ 
competition can vary in its salience and in the extent of disagreement between parties (Table 1). 
These characteristics combine to present four ideal-typical structures of issue competition: 
competitive consensus
1
 (low levels of disagreement, high salience); passive consensus (low 
disagreement, low salience); passive disagreement (high disagreement, low salience); and 
competitive disagreement (high disagreement, high salience). These ideal types help describe the 
structure of issue competition at various levels: cross-sectoral policy themes like climate policy, 
policy sectors within those themes (e.g., agricultural climate policy), and specific policy instruments 
(e.g., the adoption or rate of a carbon tax) (Guinaudeau and Persico, 2014: 314). 
 
Table 1. Structures of issue competition 
  Salience 
  Low High 
Inter-party 
disagreement 
High Passive disagreement Competitive disagreement 
Low Passive consensus Competitive consensus 
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Explaining differences in structures of issue competition 
Explanations of variation in party preferences can help us to understand differences in the structure 
of issue competition. Such explanations conceive of parties as purposive actors that compete for 
┗ﾗデWゲ H┞ aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ ヮ┌HﾉｷI ;デデｷデ┌SWゲが ヴWゲヮﾗﾐSｷﾐｪ デﾗ ┗ﾗデWヴゲげ ヮヴｷﾗヴｷデｷWゲが ;ﾐS aﾗI┌ゲｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ ｷゲゲ┌Wゲ ﾗﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ 
they are perceived as crediHﾉWき デｴW┞ ;ﾉゲﾗ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐS デﾗ ﾗデｴWヴ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ WﾉWIデﾗヴ;ﾉ ゲ┌IIWゲゲ ;ﾐS デﾗ デｴWｷヴ 
preferences (Klüver, 2020: 978-981; Abou-Chadi et al., 2020: 750-751 for reviews; see also Meguid, 
2008; Spoon et al., 2014; Abou-Chadi, 2016). Not all influences on party preferences have received 
equal attention. We know less about ideological constraints and interest group influence, in 
particular, than about other factors (e.g., public attitudes, party competition). Ideological constraints 
ｷﾐIﾉ┌SW ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ヮ;ゲデ ﾗヴ Iヴﾗゲゲ-cutting preferences (Meyer, 2013; Ladrech and Little, 2019). Systematic 
ヴWゲW;ヴIｴ ﾗﾐ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIW ﾗﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲ ｴ;ゲ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ヴWIWﾐデﾉ┞ HWｪ┌ﾐ デﾗ 
emerge (Otjes and Green-Pedersen, 2019; Klüver, 2020). 
To help explain differences between structures of issue competition on climate policy, we focus on 
three factors that a comparison of the UK and Ireland can help illuminate, given differences in their 
party systems: interest group-party relationships, party ideology, and competition from challenger 
parties. Given its potentially profound economic consequences, interest groups have strong reasons 
デﾗ ゲWWﾆ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIW ﾗﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲき ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲ ;ヴW ﾉｷﾆWﾉ┞ デﾗ HW 
constrained by their other policy preferences, especially given that climate policy is rarely a top 
ヮヴｷﾗヴｷデ┞き ;ﾐS デｴWヴW ;ヴW ﾗaデWﾐ ｷSWﾐデｷaｷ;HﾉW けIｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWヴゲげ ﾗa デｴW Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ status quo, both green 
parties and climate sceptics.  
Interest group influence on party preferences has until recently been a lacuna in the literature 
(Klüver, 2020: 980-981). Recent studies focusing on Germany and on labour market policy in 
comparative perspective have shown that interest group mobilisation influences party preferences, 
that this relationship is moderated by voter preferences (Klüver, 2020), and that interest groups can 
exert more influence than competing parties (Otjes and Green-Pedersen, 2019). Otjes and 
Rasmussen (2017) show that interest group-party collaboration is shaped by the structure of the 
party system. These studies assume that interest group-ヮ;ヴデ┞ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲ ;ヴW ヴﾗﾗデWS ｷﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ 
responses to their capacity to deliver information, electoral support, or finances.  
Case study research in comparative climate politics has examined interest group influence on party 
preferences (Farstad, 2019, Leiren et al., 2020) and the role of economic interests in shaping policy 
(e.g., Eikeland and Inderberg, 2016; Mildenberger, 2020). Mildenberger (2020) argues that carbon-
intensive business and labour interests benefit from けSﾗ┌HﾉW ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐげ ｷﾐ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ デｴ;デ 
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can overcome divides in the party system by mobilising politicians across the political spectrum to 
resist climate policy initiatives. This double-representation is moderated by institutional context: 
where economic interest groups have guaranteed, consistent access to policymakers, the politics of 
climate change is characterised by low conflict and salience; otherwise, the structure of climate 
politics is more variable.  
The literatures on comparative climate politics and on interest group influence on party preferences 
remain isolated from one another. Yet, both Mildenberger (2020) and Otjes and Rasmussen (2017) 
argue that institutional conditions moderate interest group-party relations. Our contribution is to 
examine this argument, focusing on climate politics and institutional differences between the UK 
and Ireland.  
We also expect party ideologyが ﾗヴ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲ ﾗﾐ ｷゲゲ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ I┌デ ;Iヴﾗゲゲ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ 
such as taxation, regulation, spending, or subsidies, to shape their climate policy preferences. A 
party that opposes new taxes, for example, is unlikely to advocate a carbon tax. At the system level, 
this manifests itself in broader patterns of conflict and consensus (e.g., on economic policy) being 
reflected in the structure of competition on climate policy. While there is evidence of correlations 
between left-right ideology and climate policy preferences in the aggregate (Farstad, 2018; Carter et 
al., 2018), empirical evidence identifying specific cross-cutting issues shaping climate policy 
preferences is limited (Båtstrand, 2014; Ladrech and Little, 2019). 
Climate policy competition will also be influenced by the strength of challenger parties with outlying 
preferences, such as green or climate-sceptic parties. These parties influence the structure of 
climate politics directly by their presence (they are part of the structure of issue competition), and 
ｷﾐSｷヴWIデﾉ┞ H┞ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIｷﾐｪ ﾗデｴWヴ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ｷﾐIWﾐデｷ┗Wゲ デﾗ IﾗﾏヮWデW ┘ｷデｴ デｴWﾏ ﾗﾐ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞く Existing 
research provides evidence of various responses to green parties on the environment (Meguid, 
2008: ch.5; Spoon et al., 2014; Abou-Chadi, 2016), but less evidence of the underlying mechanism 
driven by vote-seeking competition (Ladrech and Little, 2019).  
  
Cases and analytical approach 
A case study approach can be used to examine structures of issue competition in terms of positions 
and salience and at multiple issue-levels (theme, sector, and instrument); it can also illuminate the 
mechanisms by which interest groups, party ideology, and challengers influence the structure of 
climate politics. We focus on the UK and Ireland from 1997 until 2019, a period that begins with the 
negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, which put climate policy on domestic political agendas, and ends 
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after the UK general election of December 2019. We present the case studies in two periods に pre- 
and post-2010 に as there were significant changes in the conditions shaping climate politics around 
2010, with austerity policy responses to the global economic crisis, the growing polarisation in 
British politics, and the post-CﾗヮWﾐｴ;ｪWﾐ S┌ﾏﾏｷデ ゲﾉ┌ﾏヮ ｷﾐ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞げゲ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ ゲ;ﾉｷWﾐIWく TｴW 
case studies draw on sources including secondary literature, existing data on party preferences 
(Appendix A), interviews with party and interest group representatives, and election manifestos.
2
 
We focus on three climate policy sectors that cover 60-75% of emissions in the UK and Ireland: 
transport, electricity generation, and agriculture. These sectors include the two largest emissions 
sectors in both countries. In 2018, transport was the largest contributing sector to GHG emissions in 
the UK (28%) and second-largest in Ireland (20%). Electricity generation was the second-largest in 
the UK (23%) and third-largest in Ireland (18%). Agriculture was the largest sector in Ireland (34%) 
and the fifth-largest in the UK (10%). We also focus on two cross-sectoral instruments: domestic 
carbon pricing and framework climate legislation. 
The UK and Ireland are けﾏﾗゲデ ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲげく TｴW┞ ;ヴW ヮ;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏゲ ┘ｷデｴ ゲデヴﾗﾐｪが 
centralised executives and weak upper houses; until January 2020, both were EU members; they are 
wealthy; and they have relatively low vulnerability to climate change impacts. They have both been 
characterised by modest levels of public concern about climate change, so cross-national differences 
in party competition are unlikely to be explained by differences in public opinion (Figure 1; European 
Commission 2020).  
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Figure 1: Public concern about climate change in the UK and Ireland, 2005-2019 
 
We focus on how their very different party systems shape structures of issue competition on climate 
policy. The UK is characterised by majoritarian politics centred on a left-right cleavage, dominated by 
Labour, the Conservatives and, until 2015, the Liberal Democrats, with weak Green parties. It 
became increasingly polarised in the 2010s and saw the rise of climate-sceptic, right-wing UKIP. 
IヴWﾉ;ﾐSげゲ ヮ;ヴデ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ Sｷゲデｷﾐｪ┌ｷゲｴWS H┞ デｴW ｷSWﾗﾉogical proximity of the centre-right Fianna 
Fáil (FF) and Fine Gael (FG) parties and competition between them to lead coalition governments. 
Among several other parties is a small Green Party that has had greater relevance at national level 
than its sister parties in the UK, and there is no significant right-wing party.  
Ireland and the UK also differ in their constellations of economic interest groups and how they 
interact with the party system. In the UK the historic links between trade unions and Labour and 
between business interests and the Conservatives remain strong; in Ireland, neither have 
institutionalised links with FF or FG, and access to policymakers has been fairly bi-partisan (interest 
group representative, personal interview, January 2015), facilitated by a tripartite Social Partnership 
process until 2009. Their economies are also structured differently: the UK has a long-established 
ﾏ;ﾐ┌a;Iデ┌ヴｷﾐｪ ゲWIデﾗヴ ;ﾐS ; ﾉ;ヴｪWヴ W┝デヴ;Iデｷ┗W ゲWIデﾗヴが ┘ｴｷﾉW IヴWﾉ;ﾐSげゲ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ｴ;ゲ aﾗI┌ゲWS 
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on attracting Foreign Direct Investment from the technology and pharmaceutical sectors, with a 
proportionally larger agriculture sector specialising in livestock farming.  
  
United Kingdom 
1997-2010 
Before the 2005 general election, competition on climate change was characterised by a mixture of 
passive consensus, passive disagreement and, on transport policy, competitive disagreement. Both 
ヮ;ヴデｷWゲ ;IIWヮデWS Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ゲIｷWﾐIW ;ﾐS ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデWS SWﾉｷ┗Wヴ┞ ﾗa デｴW UKげゲ K┞ﾗデﾗ GHG ヴWS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ デ;ヴｪWデく 
Although of low salience for both parties, Labour was more willing to develop climate change 
mitigation policies (Mildenberger, 2020: 222-223). The Labour Government elected in 1997 adopted 
a 2010 target of a 20% reduction in CO2 Wﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐゲ デｴ;デ ┘Wﾐデ HW┞ﾗﾐS デｴW UKげゲ K┞ﾗデﾗ デ;ヴｪWデく YWデが 
despite a Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution report highlighting significant weaknesses in 
デｴW L;Hﾗ┌ヴ Gﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞が デｴW CﾗﾐゲWヴ┗;デｷ┗W ヲヰヰヱ ﾏ;ﾐｷaWゲデﾗ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWS weakening key 
Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWゲが ﾐﾗデ;Hﾉ┞ H┞ ;Hﾗﾉｷゲｴｷﾐｪ L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ﾐW┘ Cﾉｷﾏ;デW Cｴ;ﾐｪW Levy on energy use by large 
businesses.  
WｴWヴW;ゲ デｴW L;Hﾗ┌ヴ Gﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ‘WﾐW┘;HﾉW EﾐWヴｪ┞ OHﾉｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐ ふ‘EOぶ ;ﾏﾗ┌ﾐデWS デﾗ ; ゲ┌HゲｷS┞ ﾗa 
around £5 billion by 2010, Conservative support for renewables lacked any spending commitment. 
The parties adopted contrasting positions on transport policy where their climate measures 
mirrored longstanding preferences for either public or private transport. Road transport was 
politicised by nationwide fuel protests in 2000 causing panic in government circles and prompting a 
brief surge in Conservative support (Blair, 2010: 291-298). Consequently, the Conservatives 
campaigned in 2001 with a headline-grabbing commitment to cut petrol tax by 6p per litre and 
SWヮｷIデWS L;Hﾗ┌ヴ ;ゲ け;ﾐデｷ-I;ヴげが ┘ｴｷﾉW aﾗ┌ヴ ┞W;ヴゲ ﾉ;デWヴ デｴW┞ ヮヴﾗﾏｷゲWS デﾗ WﾐS L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ け┘;ヴ ﾗﾐ デｴW 
ﾏﾗデﾗヴｷゲデげが ヴW┗ｷW┘ デｴW ┌ゲW ﾗa ゲヮWWS I;ﾏWヴ;ゲが ;ﾐS ﾏﾗSWヴﾐｷゲW デｴW ヴﾗ;S ﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆく L;Hﾗ┌ヴ Iﾗ┌ﾐデWヴWS H┞ 
promising huge infrastructure investment, particularly on public transport, but avoided increases in 
fuel duties.  
D;┗ｷS C;ﾏWヴﾗﾐげゲ WﾉWItion as Conservative leader (December 2005) was the catalyst for a new 
けIﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗W IﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲげ ｷﾐ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ┘ｴWﾐ ;ﾉﾉ デｴヴWW ﾏ;ﾃﾗヴ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲ H;デデﾉWS デﾗ HW デｴW けｪヴWWﾐWゲデげ 
on climate policy (Carter and Jacobs, 2014). Tony Blair had helped push climate change on the 
international stage, notably by placing it on the agenda for the 2005 Gleneagles G8 Summit (Blair, 
ヲヰヱヰぎ ヵヶンぶく YWデ L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ SﾗﾏWゲデｷI ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ に its anaemic Climate Change Programme (March 2006), 
for example に left it vulnerable to attack. Cameron embraced climate change in his drive to detoxify 
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デｴW CﾗﾐゲWヴ┗;デｷ┗W ｷﾏ;ｪW ;ﾐS ｷﾐIヴW;ゲW デｴW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ;ヮヮW;ﾉ デﾗ ┞ﾗ┌ﾐｪ ┗ﾗデWヴゲ ;ﾐS ┘ﾗﾏWﾐく Hｷゲ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ aﾗヴ 
FヴｷWﾐSゲ ﾗa デｴW E;ヴデｴげゲ けTｴW Bｷｪ Aゲﾆげ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐ ┘;ゲ IヴｷデｷI;ﾉ ｷﾐ ゲWI┌ヴｷﾐｪ Iヴﾗゲゲ-party support for the 
pioneering Climate Change Act 2008 (CCA), which enshrined ambitious emissions targets in law, 
backed by five-yearly carbon budgets and an independent Committee on Climate Change to advise 
the government on policy (Lockwood, 2013; Carter and Jacobs, 2014). Political action on climate 
policy was made easier because the business community, encouraged by the economic rationale 
provided by the 2006 Stern Review, was now also onside, as illustrated by a Confederation of British 
Industry report demanding stronger climate targets and incentives for low-carbon technologies 
(Carter and Jacobs, 2014: 135).  
L;デWヴが C;ﾏWヴﾗﾐげゲ ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ EくONげゲ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWS Iﾗ;ﾉ-fired power station at Kingsnorth pressured 
Labour into banning new coal-fired power stations unless compatible with carbon capture and 
storage technology. Meanwhile, confident it would face little political opposition, and with 
burgeoning support for the Greens threatening several Labour MPs in marginal constituencies, the 
Cabinet embraced significantly more progressive climate policies to be delivered by a new 
Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) (Special Advisor, personal interview, July 2010). 
Its ambitious Low Carbon Transition Plan targeted a sevenfold increase in renewable supply and 
identified a litany of measures, including a feed-in tariff, requiring all new homes would be zero-
carbon by 2016, a home insulation programme, and a mass roll-out of smart meters, backed by huge 
infrastructure expenditure to support offshore wind and electric vehicles (Carter and Jacobs, 2014). 
Both major parties now supported the construction of new nuclear power stations. Many traditional 
differences over transport policy dissipated, as the Conservatives matched Labour in supporting 
significant rail infrastructure investment iﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ LﾗﾐSﾗﾐげゲ Cヴﾗゲゲヴ;ｷﾉが ┘ｷSWゲヮヴW;S WﾉWIデヴｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS 
constructing a North-South high-speed rail line (HS2). Indeed, Cameron trumped Labour by opposing 
the construction of a third runway at Heathrow airport on environmental grounds; significantly, 
L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ ｷデ ヴWaﾉWIデWS ゲデヴﾗﾐｪ ﾉﾗHH┞ｷﾐｪ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW H┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲ Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ┞く  
 
2010-2019 
This competitive consensus was initially sustained after the 2010 election. The three major parties 
presented manifestos containing strong climate policies and the newly-elected Conservative-Liberal 
DWﾏﾗIヴ;デ Iﾗ;ﾉｷデｷﾗﾐ ;ｪヴWWﾏWﾐデ ヮヴﾗﾏｷゲWS デｴW けｪヴWWﾐWゲデ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ W┗Wヴげが Iﾗﾏﾏｷデデｷﾐｪ inter alia to 
establish a Green Investment Bank, a Green Deal supporting household energy efficiency, a 
minimum floor price for carbon, and rejecting the third Heathrow runway.   
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However, Cameron had not persuaded all Conservative MPs to prioritise climate policy (Lockwood, 
2013: 1344); even his close ally, Chancellor George Osborne, criticised green policies as a costly 
けH┌ヴSWﾐげ ﾗﾐ Bヴｷデish businesses in the era of austerity, and lobbied hard against several climate 
measures (Guardian, 29 November 2011). With the Liberal Democrats holding the DECC portfolio, 
disgruntled Conservative backbenchers freely expressed their discontent about onshore wind farms 
and the impact of green duties on domestic energy bills. They were encouraged by the right-wing 
press and by burgeoning support for the climate-sceptic UKIP, which had fought the 2010 election 
promising to repeal the CCA, ban onshore wind farms, encourage coal extraction, abolish 
ヴWﾐW┘;HﾉWゲ ゲ┌HゲｷSｷWゲが ;ﾐS ┘ｷデｴSヴ;┘ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW EU Wﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐゲ デヴ;Sｷﾐｪ ゲIｴWﾏWく UKIPげゲ ｪヴﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ デｴヴW;デ 
encouraged sceptical Conservative MPs to frame climate change measures negatively because they 
typically involved regulations, taxes or subsidies, and often resulted from EU policies (Lockwood, 
2013: 1344).  
In order to depoliticise climate policy before the 2015 general election, the Conservative, Labour, 
and Liberal Democrat leaders produced a joint climate pledge committing them all to seek a strong, 
legally-binding global climate deal, to work together to implement the CCA, and accelerate the 
transition to a low carbon economy (Guardian, 14 February 2015). This may have prevented a 
backlash against existing policy, but did little to advance the climate agenda. 
There was increased polarisation on climate and the environment after 2010 (see data in Appendix 
A), and the manifestos provide evidence of disagreement. Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
outlined a raft of progressive climate measures, including a 2030 decarbonisation target, energy 
efficiency programmes, and promoting green jobs, although the Liberal Democrats went further by 
promising several new legislative measures, such as a Zero Carbon Act. The Conservative manifesto 
ゲデヴ┌Iﾆ ; SｷaaWヴWﾐデ デﾗﾐWぎ C;ﾏWヴﾗﾐげゲ earlier enthusiasm for climate action was reined in, even 
promising to end subsidies for onshore wind farms (while investing heavily in the nascent fracking 
sector). The transport policies of all three parties emphasised significant spending on rail 
infrastructure, Labour and the Conservatives promised price freezes, but the Conservatives 
committed to road upgrades while only the Liberal Democrats explicitly opposed the Heathrow 
runway.  
Subsequently, the newly-elected Conservative government dismantled a string of climate measures: 
removing subsidies for onshore wind farms, reducing them for solar installations and biomass, 
selling the Green Investment Bank, cutting the tax incentives for greener cars, and dropping the zero 
carbon home commitment (Guardian, 24 July 2015). Later, Prime Minister May disbanded DECC, 
moving responsibility for climate change to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
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Strategy, which sent a negative signal regarding the priority given to combating climate change 
(Guardian, 15 July 2016). Labour under Jeremy Corbyn initially appeared reluctant to challenge the 
Government on this issue, but this passive disagreement slowly shifted towards competitive 
disagreement at the snap 2017 general election. The Conservative manifesto marginalised climate 
change, with just a few references to a low carbon economy and improving energy efficiency. Yet it 
enthusiastically embraced shale gas, promising measures to fast-track applications to side-step local 
objections. Labour presented a raft of policies to promote the low carbon transition, including 
increased state intervention to deliver renewable and nuclear energy and an energy efficiency 
programme to insulate four million homes. Whereas the Conservatives promised major investment 
in both rail and roads, and now favoured a third Heathrow runway, Labour outlined an extensive 
investment programme bolstering public transport, with the headline-grabbing promise to 
renationalise the railways. Both parties supported EVs.  
The 2019 general election was dominated by Brexit, but growing public concern about climate 
change, encouraged by the high-profile school climate strikes and Extinction Rebellion protests, 
encouraged the major parties to compete fiercely with radical climate policy offers and positioning 
ふC;ヴデWヴ ;ﾐS PW;ヴゲﾗﾐが ヲヰヲヰぶく E┗Wヴ┞ ヮ;ヴデ┞ ヮヴﾗﾏｷゲWS ;ﾐ ;ﾏHｷデｷﾗ┌ゲ デ;ヴｪWデ aﾗヴ けﾐWデ ┣Wヴﾗげ Wﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐゲぎ デｴW 
CﾗﾐゲWヴ┗;デｷ┗W ヲヰヵヰ デ;ヴｪWデ ┘;ゲ デヴ┌ﾏヮWS H┞ L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ヮヴﾗﾏｷゲW デﾗ SWﾉｷ┗Wヴ ﾏﾗゲデ Wﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐ ヴWS┌Iデｷﾗﾐゲ H┞ 
2030 through a radical Green New Deal involving グヲヵヰ Hｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐ ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ デﾗ IヴW;デW ﾗﾐW ﾏｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐ けIﾉｷﾏ;デW 
ﾃﾗHゲげく L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ a;ヴ-reaching promises included a massive home energy efficiency programme, 
ヮﾉ;ﾐデｷﾐｪ ヲ Hｷﾉﾉｷﾗﾐ デヴWWゲ H┞ ヲヰヴヰが ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ a┌Wﾉ ヮﾗ┗Wヴデ┞ ;ﾐS ;ﾐ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲ ﾗﾐ ; けﾃ┌ゲデ デヴ;ﾐゲｷデｷﾗﾐげ aﾗヴ 
workers in fossil fuel industries. By contrast, the newly-upbeat Conservative rhetoric was backed by 
rather vague and less-ambitious commitments, including modest investments in energy efficiency, 
W┝デWﾐゲｷ┗W デヴWW ヮﾉ;ﾐデｷﾐｪが ;ﾐS ┘ﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ け┘ｷデｴ デｴW ﾏ;ヴﾆWデげ デﾗ SWﾉｷ┗Wヴ ヲ ﾏｷllion green jobs. Both parties 
would invest in EV infrastructure and new railway lines, although Labour would renationalise the 
railways while Conservative planned to spend £28.8 billion on roads. In short, there was a renewed 
けIﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗W IﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲげが H┌デ ;ﾉゲﾗ ゲﾗﾏW ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ SｷaaWヴWﾐIWゲが ;ゲ L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ヮヴﾗｪヴ;ﾏﾏW ┘;ゲ 
significantly more ambitious (Ibid). 
Throughout the case study (1997-2019) there were few substantive climate policy differences over 
agricultural policy, which was of low salience. Both parties repeatedly promised to push for reform 
of the Common Agricultural Policy to encourage environmental stewardship schemes, framing this 
primarily as a biodiversity issue.  
P;ヴデ┞ IﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ｷﾐ デｴW UK ﾏﾗ┗WS aヴﾗﾏ ; ヮWヴｷﾗS ﾗa けヮ;ゲゲｷ┗W IﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲげ HWデ┘WWﾐ 
the parties characterised by low salience and low disagreement (with some exceptions), through an 
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Wヴ; ﾗa けIﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗W IﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲげ ﾐﾗデ;HﾉW aﾗヴ ｴｷｪｴ ゲ;ﾉｷWﾐIW ;ﾐS ﾉﾗ┘ Sｷゲ;ｪヴWWﾏWﾐデが デﾗ ; ヮWヴｷﾗS ﾗa 
けヮ;ゲゲｷ┗W Sｷゲ;ｪヴWWﾏWﾐデげ ┘ｴWﾐ ゲ;ﾉｷWﾐIW ｴ;S SWIﾉｷﾐWS H┌デ there was considerable disagreement, 
particularly about energy policy, before fierce party competition in 2019 heralded a return of the 
けIﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗W IﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲげ ふT;HﾉW ヲぶく  
 
Table 2. UK overview 
  Salience 
  Low High 
Inter-party 
disagreement 
High 
 
Passive disagreement 
2011-2016  
 
1997-2005: REO, Climate Change 
Levy, emissions targets for 2010 
 
 
Competitive disagreement 
2016-2017 
 
1997-2006 and 2016-2019: 
Transport  
2012-2019: Onshore wind farms  
 
Low 
 
Passive consensus 
1997-2005 (low-medium 
disagreement); 2017-2018 
 
1997-2019: Agriculture 
2010-2016: Transport 
1997-2019: Nuclear energy 
2010-2019: Climate Change Act 
implementation  
 
 
 
Competitive consensus 
2006-2010; 2019 
 
 
2007-2010: Transport 
2006-2010: RE targets 
2006-2010; 2019: Climate Change 
Act, emission reduction targets 
 
 
Theme-level observations in italics; otherwise sectors and policy 
ｷﾐゲデヴ┌ﾏWﾐデゲく けEﾉWIデヴｷIｷデ┞ ｪWﾐWヴ;デｷﾗﾐげ ｷゲ Sｷゲ;ｪｪヴWｪ;デWS ｷﾐデﾗ ゲヮWIｷaｷI ｷゲゲ┌Wゲく  
 
Ireland 
1997-2010  
Climate policy was of low salience for the Irish parties until a surge in international attention made it 
electorally relevant in 2006 and 2007. There was little inter-party disagreement, with the exception 
of the Greens who consistently took distinctive positions. An early attempt to introduce a carbon tax 
was driven primarily by the FF Environment Minister but by 2004 this initiative had foundered 
amidst opposition within his own party, the Progressive Democrats (PDs, their economically liberal 
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coalition partners), and industry (Coghlan, 2007: 146-151). In 2007, the Greens were alone in 
supporting a carbon tax. 
FFが ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾉWS ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデゲ aヴﾗﾏ ヱΓΓΑ ┌ﾐデｷﾉ ヲヰヱヱが ;デデWﾏヮデWS デﾗ けｪヴWWﾐげ ｷデゲ ｷﾏ;ｪW ;ｴW;S ﾗa デｴW ヲヰヰΑ 
general election, responding to increased public concern and the possibility of coalition with the 
Greens, although it did not substantiate this move with significant positional changes. FG was, for 
ヴW;ゲﾗﾐゲ ┌ﾐヴWﾉ;デWS デﾗ Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞が デｴW GヴWWﾐ P;ヴデ┞げゲ a;┗ﾗ┌ヴWS ゲWﾐｷﾗヴ Iﾗ;ﾉｷデｷﾗﾐ ヮ;ヴデﾐWヴが ゲﾗ 
had less reason to court the Greens, and was slower to respond to the climate zeitgeist (Little, 2017: 
207-209). 
At this stage, the parties were uniformly enthusiastic about wind energy and by 2007 there was a 
competitive consensus on electricity generation from renewables: FG aimed for 33% by 2025; FF 
33% by 2020; and Labour 50% by 2020. Although concerns about energy security were cited in 
allowing peat- and coal-fired plants to open and remain unconverted to lower-carbon fuels, electoral 
politics and regional economic interests also played a significant role in energy policy. FF was 
particularly keen on peat-fired electricity generation in its 1997 manifesto and it opened two 
heavily-subsidised peat-burning stations in 2005 in its electoral heartland (Cunningham, 2008: 103-
104, 107). It was not alone: as late as its 2011 manifesto, FG was still signalling its support for 
Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌WS ヮW;デ H┌ヴﾐｷﾐｪが ┘ｴｷﾉW け;IIWヮデｷﾐｪげ デｴ;デ ｷデ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW ヮｴ;ゲWS ﾗ┌デ H┞ デｴW ﾏｷS-2020s.  
TｴW GヴWWﾐゲげ Wﾐデヴ┞ ｷﾐデﾗ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ┘ｷデｴ FF ;ﾐS デｴW PDゲ ｷﾐ ヲヰヰΑ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWS L;Hﾗ┌ヴ ┘ｷデｴ ;ﾐ 
opportunity to wrest issue ownership of climate change from them (Little, 2017: 210-211). As the UK 
CCA went through Parliament, Labour campaigned for legislation including ambitious new targets 
and a carbon budget mechanism, and in October 2009 and 2010 the cross-party Joint Committee on 
Climate Change and Energy Security published proposals for climate legislation. The Greens had 
ゲｷｪﾐ;ﾉﾉWS デｴWｷヴ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ aﾗヴ ﾉWｪｷゲﾉ;デｷ┗W デ;ヴｪWデゲ ┘ｷデｴ ; Pヴｷ┗;デW MWﾏHWヴゲげ Bｷﾉﾉ ｷﾐ ヲヰヰヵ ;ﾐS ｷﾐ OIデﾗHWヴ 
2009 they extracted from FF a commitment to a climate law (Torney, 2017: 252-260).  
Fヴﾗﾏ ヲヰヰΒが IヴWﾉ;ﾐSげゲ SWWヮ WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI Iヴｷゲｷゲ ﾏW;ﾐデ デｴ;デ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗ ﾉﾗﾐｪWヴ ; ヮヴｷﾗヴｷデ┞ aﾗヴ デｴW 
parties, although they stressed their support for measures that could provide employment and 
growth, such as retrofitting homes. Under pressure from a fiscal crisis and the Greens, FF agreed in 
2009 to the introduction of a carbon tax (Convery et al., 2013); it also introduced an air travel tax of 
オン ヮWヴ aﾉｷｪｴデく TｴW ﾗヮヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗHﾃWIデWSが H┌デ ﾗﾐIW ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌IWSが デｴW I;ヴHﾗﾐ デ;x was quickly 
;IIﾗﾏﾏﾗS;デWSぎ H┞ デｴW ヲヰヱヱ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ WﾉWIデｷﾗﾐが FG ;ﾐS L;Hﾗ┌ヴ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWS ｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪ ｷデ aヴﾗﾏ オヱヵっデﾗﾐﾐW 
デﾗ オヲヵっデﾗﾐﾐWき ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞げゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ デｴW I;ヴHﾗﾐ デ;┝ ;ﾉゲﾗ W┗ﾗﾉ┗WS ふIﾐデWヴWゲデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ;デｷ┗Wが 
personal interview, January 2015).  
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Although it aIIﾗ┌ﾐデWS aﾗヴ ;ヴﾗ┌ﾐS ンヰХ ﾗa IヴWﾉ;ﾐSげゲ GHG Wﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐゲが ;ｪヴｷI┌ﾉデ┌ヴW ┘;ゲ ｷﾐ SWIﾉｷﾐW ;ﾐS ┘;ゲ 
ﾗa ﾉﾗ┘ ゲ;ﾉｷWﾐIWく Iﾐ ヲヰヰヰが デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ aｷヴゲデ N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Cﾉｷﾏ;デW Cｴ;ﾐｪW Sデヴ;デWｪ┞ ふNCCSぶ Wﾐ┗ｷゲ;ｪWS ; 
5% decline in herd numbers contributing to emissions reductions; the revised NCCS (2007) also 
envisaged a long-term reduction in agricultural emissions. The parties tended to defend the 
declining agricultural sector and the main driver of agricultural emissions に herd numbers に was not 
on the political agenda (Little, 2020).  
On transport, the parties typically favoured significant investment in both roads and public transport 
projects. The Greens and sometimes Labour (e.g., in its 2002 manifesto) clearly prioritised public 
transport. Several parties opposed or sought broad exceptions to road tolls (e.g., FF in 1997, SF and 
Labour in 2007) and with some exceptions (mainly the Greens) the parties also tended to support, or 
not to oppose, expanding aviation infrastructure, especially regional airports. 
 
2010-2019  
In contrast to the UK, inter-party disagreement declined during the 2010s (Appendix A), albeit the 
main issue on the agenda until 2015 に climate legislation に was somewhat divisive. In the last days of 
the FF-led government in December 2010, the Greens published a draft law that contained targets 
for 2050, 2030, and each year until 2020. There was strong resistance from within FF, spurred on by 
デｴW ﾏ;ｷﾐ ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ ﾉﾗHH┞ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ ;ﾐS H┞ デｴW ﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ﾉ;ヴｪWゲデ a;ヴﾏWヴゲげ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ ｷデが 
but the party leader insisted on it as necessary to sustain the coalition (Special Advisors, personal 
interviews, December 2014 and July 2015). The Bill fell with the Dáil in early 2011, but climate 
legislation was firmly on the political agenda. Labour entered government with FG in 2011 
committed to enacting climate legislation that included emissions reduction targets of 3% per 
;ﾐﾐ┌ﾏく FG a;┗ﾗ┌ヴWS ヮ┌デデｷﾐｪ IヴWﾉ;ﾐSげゲ ヲヰヲヰ EU デ;ヴｪWデゲ ｷﾐ ﾉ;┘が H┌デ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ﾗﾐ デｴW H;ゲｷゲ ﾗa ;ﾉﾉ-party 
agreement. The coalition agreement dispensed with this cﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ H┌デ ﾗデｴWヴ┘ｷゲW ヴWaﾉWIデWS FGげゲ 
preferred targets (the equivalent of a 2.5% reduction per annum); however, it soon became clear 
that the legislation was not a priority for the party (Torney, 2017: 252-260).  
The only target specified in the ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ Hｷﾉﾉ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWS ｷﾐ ヲヰヱン ┘;ゲ けデヴ;ﾐゲｷデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ; ﾉﾗ┘ I;ヴHﾗﾐが 
climate resilient and environmentally sustainable economy in the period up to and including the year 
ヲヰヵヰげ ふDECLG ヲヰヱンぶき けﾉﾗ┘ I;ヴHﾗﾐげ ┘;ゲ ﾉ;デWヴ ゲヮWIｷaｷWS ｷﾐ ; けN;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ PﾗﾉｷI┞ Pﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐげ ;ゲ ;n 80% 
reduction across non-;ｪヴｷI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWIデﾗヴゲ ;ﾐS け;ﾐ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ I;ヴHﾗﾐ ﾐW┌デヴ;ﾉｷデ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW ;ｪヴｷI┌ﾉデ┌ヴW 
and land-use sector, including forestry, which does not compromise capacity for sustainable food 
ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐげ ふGﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾗa IヴWﾉ;ﾐSが ヲヰヱヴぶく FG ﾏ;SW ゲﾗﾏe concessions, notably guaranteeing the 
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ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIW ﾗa デｴW ﾐW┘ ;S┗ｷゲﾗヴ┞ HﾗS┞ ;ﾐS ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ; IﾗﾏﾏｷデﾏWﾐデ デﾗ けIﾉｷﾏ;デW ﾃ┌ゲデｷIWげが H┌デ デｴW 
main provisions remained the same (Torney, 2017: 252-260). FF, meanwhile, remained unwilling to 
insist on targets (NGO representative, personal interview, June 2016). 
With the publication of the Food Harvest 2020 (2010) and Food Wise 2025 (2015) policies, 
agriculture went from being a sunset industry to being a growing contributor to export-led economic 
growth, with plans to ｷﾐIヴW;ゲW IヴWﾉ;ﾐSげゲ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ｴWヴS H┞ ンヰヰがヰヰヰ ふIrish Times, 12 December 2015). 
Aﾉﾉ aﾗ┌ヴ ﾏ;ﾃﾗヴ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲ ｴ;S ゲｷｪﾐｷaｷI;ﾐデ WﾉWIデﾗヴ;ﾉ ;ﾏHｷデｷﾗﾐゲ ｷﾐ ヴ┌ヴ;ﾉ ;ヴW;ゲ ;ﾐSが WﾐIﾗ┌ヴ;ｪWS H┞ a;ヴﾏWヴゲげ 
ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐゲげ ゲデヴﾗﾐｪ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌WﾐI┞-level networks, supported this vision. The contradictions between 
L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ ;ﾏHｷデｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ;ﾐS ｷデゲ Wﾐデｴ┌ゲｷ;ゲデｷI ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ aﾗヴ ;ｪヴｷI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ W┝ヮ;ﾐゲｷﾗﾐ I;┌ゲWS 
some intra-party tensions. Ireland successfully sought significant flexibilities for land use as part of 
its EU 2030 emissions targets and at the Paris COP in December 2015 Taoiseach (PM) Enda Kenny 
told journalists that Irish agricultural production would not be compromised by climate policy; this 
assertion went unchallenged by FF, SF, or Labour (Irish Times, 24 February 2016). In a 2016 televised 
debate among the leaders of the four main parties, none conceded that reduced ambition in 
;ｪヴｷI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ┘;ゲ ﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴ┞ デﾗ ;IｴｷW┗W IヴWﾉ;ﾐSげゲ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗Wゲく Oﾐﾉ┞ デｴW GヴWWﾐゲ 
に who held no parliamentary seats from 2011-2016 に opposed herd expansion (Augustenborg, 
2016). 
Mobilisation against energy infrastructure increased sharply, causing a change-of-heart among 
politicians (NGO representative, personal interview, June 2016). While at the 2011 general election, 
ﾏ;ﾐ┞ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ support for onshore wind energy had softened, by 2016, most parties indicated that 
they wished to restrict, review, or diversify away from onshore wind energy. Likewise, the 
preservation of raised bogs (carbon sinks) prompted significant local political mobilisation in support 
of turbary rights, which led the FG-Labour government to reduce protection for them. Using coal and 
peat for electricity generation, of concern to their owners (state-owned companies), unions, and 
communities that depended on fossil fuel-aｷヴWS ヮﾉ;ﾐデゲ aﾗヴ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデが ヴ;ﾐｪWS aヴﾗﾏ デｴW GヴWWﾐゲげ 
IﾗﾏﾏｷデﾏWﾐデ デﾗ ヮｴ;ゲW デｴWﾏ ﾗ┌デ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ aｷ┗W ┞W;ヴゲ デﾗ ﾗデｴWヴ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲ;ﾉゲ デﾗ ヴWヮﾉ;IW aﾗゲゲｷﾉ a┌Wﾉゲ 
with lower-carbon fuels over longer periods (Augustenborg, 2016). 
Transport policy remained an area of broad consensus, although the Greens continued to differ from 
the other parties in consistently prioritising public transport and slow modes. At the 2011 election 
Labour renewed its support for regional airport connectivity, aligning with its geographically broader 
electoral ambitions, while FG campaigned to abolish the air travel tax and fulfilled that promise in 
2014.  
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In 2019 when the economy was performing strongly, and in the context of mobilisation by 
environmentalist social movements and increased focus on climate change internationally, climate 
policy became salient again for the public (Figure 1) and the parties. After a decade in the doldrums, 
the Green Party recovered in opinion polls in the Spring, and in May it quadrupled its representation 
in local government and secured two seats in the European Parliament. 
The cross-party Joint Oireachtas Committee on Climate Action, which reported in March 2019, 
agreed a wide variety of climate policy measures, presenting a broad consensus among the parties 
on climate policy, including on a proposal for new, more effective climate legislation and the need to 
examine land-use change and diversification in agriculture; much of this was reflected in the FG-led 
ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ Cﾉｷﾏ;デW AIデｷﾗﾐ Pﾉ;ﾐが ヮ┌HﾉｷゲｴWS ｷﾐ J┌ne. However, the issue that drew most attention 
was increasing the carbon tax: it generated significant divisions between leftist parties (including 
Sｷﾐﾐ FYｷﾐぶが ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾗヮヮﾗゲWS ｷデが ;ﾐS デｴW ﾗデｴWヴ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ a;┗ﾗ┌ヴWS ｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪ ｷデ デﾗ オΒヰっデﾗﾐﾐW H┞ 
2030 (Little, 2020).  
Cﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ┘;ゲ デｴ┌ゲ Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲWS H┞ ; けヮ;ゲゲｷ┗W IﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲげ aﾗヴ ﾏﾗゲデ ﾗa デｴW ヮWヴｷﾗS ヱΓΓΑ-2019, 
apart from a brief period around the 2007 general election and in 2019, when there were signs of a 
けIﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗W IﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲげ ふT;HﾉW ンぶく TｴW GヴWWﾐ Party consistently took distinct positions, but was too 
small to make a significant direct impact on the structure of competition, and specific issues 
including climate legislation and carbon taxation were the focus of broader inter-party 
disagreement.  
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Table 3. Ireland overview 
  Salience 
  Low High 
Inter-party 
disagreement 
High 
 
Passive disagreement 
 
 
2009-2010, 2018-2019: Carbon 
tax 
2007-2015: Climate legislation 
 
 
 
Competitive disagreement 
 
Low 
 
Passive consensus 
1997-2005; 2008-2018  
 
1997-2019: Transport 
1997-2019: Agriculture 
1997-2019: Electricity generation 
1997-2008, 2011-2018: Carbon 
tax 
2018-2019: Climate legislation 
 
 
 
 
Competitive consensus 
2006-2007; 2019 
 
2006-2007: RE targets 
 
 
Theme-level observations in italics; otherwise sectors and policy 
instruments. 
 
 
Analysis and discussion 
The structure of issue competition on climate policy に its salience and the degree of inter-party 
disagreement に differs between countries, and within countries it differs over time and between 
climate policy issues. Our case studies show that the typical pattern of climate politics in the UK and 
especially in Ireland has tended towards consensus, although it became increasingly polarised in the 
UK in the 2010s, in tandem with broader patterns of political competition. The salience of climate 
policy has varied, peaking in 2006-2007 and again in 2019 in both countries. However, increased 
salience has not itself driven inter-party disagreement; if anything, increased public salience has 
been an incentive not only for increased salience among the parties, but also for increased 
convergence. At sector and instrument level, low levels of inter-party disagreement were evident in 
Ireland and the UK around agriculture and major elements of energy and transport policy. However, 
there was disagreement and even evidence of high-salience けIﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗W Sｷゲ;ｪヴWWﾏWﾐデげ ｷn the UK on 
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some issues, especially from 1997 to 2005 and in the mid-2010s, and  there was some division on 
climate legislation and carbon tax in Ireland (Tables 2 and 3).  
TｴW けﾏﾗゲデ-ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴげ I;ゲWゲ ﾗa IヴWﾉ;ﾐS ;ﾐS デｴW UK ｴWﾉヮ ┌ゲ デﾗ W┝;ﾏｷﾐW ｴﾗ┘ interest groups influence the 
structure of party competition on climate policy in countries with different configurations of interest 
group-party relationships due to differences in their party systems. Prior to 2005, traditional ties 
┘ｷデｴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲ ┘WヴW ヴWaﾉWIデWS ｷﾐ デｴW UK ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ゲWIデﾗヴ;ﾉ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲぎ aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが L;Hﾗ┌ヴげゲ 
Climate Change Levy provoked fierce industry opposition, while protests against its fuel duties were 
┘ｷSWゲヮヴW;S ;ﾏﾗﾐｪゲデ a;ヴﾏWヴゲ ;ﾐS ヴﾗ;S ｴ;┌ﾉｷWヴゲく Iﾐ IヴWﾉ;ﾐSが FF ;ﾐS FG ｴ;S ﾏﾗヴW げWI┌ﾏWﾐｷI;ﾉげ 
relationships with the major interest groups and in an electoral system that produce intense local 
competition, had similar incentives to protect regional economic interests (e.g., fossil fuel plants, 
regional airports, the rural economy). Together with the low level of ideological diversity, this was 
highly conducive to preference convergence. These observations are consistent with the argument 
that institutional conditions moderate interest group collaboration with and influence on parties.  
TｴW I;ゲW ゲデ┌SｷWゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ ゲｴﾗ┘ デｴW ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐIW ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲげ ;ｪWﾐI┞ ;ﾐS デｴWｷヴ W┗ﾗﾉ┗ｷﾐｪ 
preferences. Agricultural policy in Ireland provides a clear example of interest groups using an 
economic crisis to frame sectoral interests as national economic interests and to sustain an 
expansionary consensus across governments by working across party lines; this lobby was also 
organised such that it could engage effectively with parties at local level in a candidate-centred 
system.  
Changes in interest group preferences also mattered: after 2006 in the UK, for example, the 
burgeoning support for action on climate change within the business community (and among trade 
unions) made it much easier for all parties to embrace progressive climate policies. While 
Mildenberger (2020: 3) argues that the representation of economic interests by parties typically 
allows carbon polluters to obstruct progressive climate policies, conversely, evolving preferences 
among business interest groups and unions in the UK and Ireland undoubtedly enabled the main 
parties to develop new policy positions in favour of climate action. 
There is strong evidence of preferences on cross-cutting issues Iﾗﾐゲデヴ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲ ﾗﾐ 
climate policy. Although both countries have tended towards consensus on climate politics, this 
tendency is much stronger in Ireland where left-right differences have long been marginal, while 
left-right diffeヴWﾐIWゲ ｷﾐa┌ゲW Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ｷﾐ デｴW UKが Iﾗﾐゲデヴ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲWゲく 
For example, during the period of considerable inter-party disagreement on climate policy in the UK 
in 2015-ヲヰヱΑが デｴW ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ HﾗヴW ; IﾉW;ヴ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ｷﾏヮヴｷnt. Similarly, positional politics on 
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transport climate policy (1997-2005) was fuelled by longstanding left-right divisions over public and 
private transport, while convergence on transport came with Cameronげゲ ﾏﾗSWヴﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ. In 
Ireland, the Greens were often alone in proposing distinctive positions; where significant positional 
differences existed between the centre-left more generally and the centre-right, they were most 
notable on climate legislation until 2015, which was not a highly ideological debate.  
With regard to challenger ヮ;ヴデｷWゲが デｴW Iヴｷゲｴ GヴWWﾐ P;ヴデ┞げゲ ヴWﾉW┗;ﾐIWが ｷﾐ ; ヮヴﾗヮﾗヴデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐ 
electoral system that fosters intense electoral competition in every constituency, provoked 
accommodative responses from other parties に especially those close to it in the political space, such 
;ゲ L;Hﾗ┌ヴが ;ﾐS WゲヮWIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ┘ｴWﾐ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ ┘;ゲ ゲ;ﾉｷWﾐデ ふヲヰヰΑが ヲヰヱΓぶく Iﾐ デｴW UKが デｴW GヴWWﾐゲげ 
ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIW ﾗﾐ ﾗデｴWヴ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲ ┘;ゲ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ┘W;ﾆ S┌W ｷﾐ ヮ;ヴデ デﾗ デｴW ヮﾉ┌ヴ;ﾉｷデ┞ WﾉWIデﾗヴ;ﾉ 
system. More significant than the Greens was the emergence of right-wing, climate-sceptic UKIP, 
which helped drag the Conservative right to adopt more partisan positions, reflected in growing 
Conservative discontent about onshore wind farms and green energy levies. These findings add to 
the evidence for accommodative responses to challenger success on the environment (Spoon et al., 
2014; cf. Abou-Chadi 2016), even where they are not issue-owners.  
Together, the findings of this study help to illustrate the channels through which observed 
differences between left and right on climate policy (Båtstrand, 2014; Carter et al., 2018; Farstad, 
2018) are generated, and how convergent climate policy preferences are sustained where those left-
right differences are weak. The case ゲデ┌SｷWゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘ ┌ゲ デﾗ ﾗHゲWヴ┗W デｴ;デ デｴW けｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮげが 
けｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げが ;ﾐS けIｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWヴげ Iｴ;ﾐﾐWﾉゲ ;ヴW ﾐﾗデ ゲWヮ;ヴ;デW ;ﾐS ;ヴW ゲﾗﾏWデｷﾏWゲ IﾉﾗゲWﾉ┞ ;ﾉｷｪﾐWSく Fﾗヴ 
example, configurations of interest group-party relations に such as the business-Conservative 
relationship に had ideological content and was not just a resource exchange relationship, while the 
ﾏﾗヴW けWI┌ﾏWﾐｷI;ﾉげ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデ ｪヴﾗ┌ヮ-party relationships in Ireland mirrored the more convergent party 
system. The Conservatives were compelled to compete with UKIP on the cross-cutting issues of 
regulation, taxation, subsidies, and the EU: both party competition and intra-party constraints drew 
them into that position.  
Finally, the case studies also show that consensus may be necessary but not sufficient for valence 
competition. In Ireland and the UK, the content of climate policy consensuses was not always 
oriented towards reducing emissions. Agricultural climate policy in Ireland is perhaps the clearest 
example: from 2010, the consensus centred on policy that would increase emissions. This violates an 
assumption of valence competition when applied to environmental policy に that parties agree on the 
need to protect the environment に and therefore further calls into question the assumption that 
climate and environmental policy is invariably a valence issue. It underlines that the association 
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between political consensus and effective climate policy (e.g., Christoff and Eckersley, 2011: 440) 
depends on the substance of that consensus.  
 
Conclusion 
This article analyses structures of issue competition on climate policy in order to examine the role of 
interest group-party relations, cross-cutting issues, and challenger parties in shaping those 
structures. It makes three contributions. First, it breaks with the long practice of conceptualising and 
operationalising climate change and the environment as matters of either salience or position. It 
argues that climate politics is characterised by variation in salience and inter-party disagreement, 
and it has suggested that the substance (overall position) of the system on an issue should also be 
デ;ﾆWﾐ ｷﾐデﾗ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ ┘ｴWﾐ ;ゲゲWゲゲｷﾐｪ デｴW け┗;ﾉWﾐIWげ ゲデ;デ┌ゲ ﾗa ;ﾐ ｷゲゲ┌Wく B┞ ゲｴﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ 
IﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗﾐ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ I;ﾐ W┝ｷゲデ W┗Wﾐ ｷﾐ Iﾉ;ゲゲｷI け┗;ﾉWﾐIWげ IﾗﾐデW┝デゲが ｷデ デ;ﾆWゲ ┌ヮ デｴW Iｴ;ﾉﾉenge of 
empirically investigating rather than assuming the structure of issue competition (Stokes, 1963; 
Clarke et al., 2009; Guinaudeau and Persico, 2014). In doing so at theme, sector, and instrument 
level, it has shown that these structures of competition can coexist within a policy theme. Future 
research might focus on heterogeneity in the structure of issue competition on climate policy at 
theme, sector, and instrument levels in other contexts. These might include systems where climate 
politics is highly positional, such as Australia or the USA, to investigate the extent to which some 
aspects of their climate politics are characterised by consensus, contrary to the dominant mode of 
climate politics. 
Second, it contributes to the underdeveloped literatures on the influence of interest groups (Klüver, 
2020; Otjes and Green-PWSWヴゲWﾐが ヲヰヱΓぶ ;ﾐS ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ Iﾗﾐゲデヴ;ｷﾐデゲ ふMW┞Wヴが ヲヰヱンぶ ﾗﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ 
preferences. It shows how interest group relations with parties tend to cluster with issue-conflicts 
(or theiヴ ;HゲWﾐIWぶが ;ﾐS デｴ┌ゲ デｴW ｷゲゲ┌Wゲ デｴ;デ I┌デ ;Iヴﾗゲゲ ;ﾐS Iﾗﾐゲデヴ;ｷﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ 
preferences. As existing studies of interest group influence have focused on issue salience, one 
additional direction that this study points to is further research on theｷヴ WaaWIデゲ ﾗﾐ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐゲが 
┘ｴｷIｴ ;ヴW ﾗaデWﾐ デｴW ヮヴｷﾏ;ヴ┞ ﾗHﾃWIデ ﾗa デｴWゲW ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲげ Waaﾗヴデゲく Iデ ;ﾉゲﾗ ｴｷｪｴﾉｷｪｴデゲ デｴW ﾐWWS aﾗヴ ヴWゲW;ヴIｴ 
on interest groups in climate politics and research on interest group influence on party preferences 
to speak to one another. 
Third, this article contributes to the burgeoning literature on the party politics of climate change, 
including on the roles of challenger parties and ideological constraints, respectively, in shaping the 
structure of issue competition on climate policy. It adds to established findings on the role of 
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challenger parties and cross-cutting issues with case-level evidence of mechanisms that are often 
assumed but less frequently exposed empirically, describing how party preferences on multiple 
cross-cutting issues に taxes, spending, subsidies, and regulations に have structured climate politics. 
In addition to showing how green parties with outlying climate policy preferences have been 
accommodated, it also describes the accommodation of a climate-sceptic party in the UK. These 
findings complement those of existing cross-national research (Spoon et al., 2014; Farstad, 2018). 
Together, they show that much hangs on the broadest structures of party politics, although within 
this broad structure, there is variation between issues and over time. 
 
  
                                                          
1
 See Carter and Jacobs (2014) for previous usage. 
2
 Iﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ aヴﾗﾏ ﾏ;ﾐｷaWゲデﾗゲ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ ヴWaWヴWﾐIWSき デｴW デW┝デゲ I;ﾐ HW aﾗ┌ﾐS ;デ デｴW M;ﾐｷaWゲデﾗ PヴﾗﾃWIデげゲ ┘WHゲｷデW 
(Volkens et al. 2019). 
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